YOUWIN2018

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DE RUEHYD #0256/01 0711639
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R 121639Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9777
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YAOUNDE 000256 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KCOR CM
SUBJECT: CAMEROON'S JUSTICE MINISTER SAYS NORTH WILL 
SUPPORT BIYA, BUT NOT ANOTHER BETI OR BAMI 
 
REF: A. YAOUNDE 225 
     ¶B. YAOUNDE 237 
     ¶C. YAOUNDE 246 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Tad Brown for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary.  The struggle for Cameroon's future, 
including President Paul Biya's succession, should be viewed 
through ethnic and regional lenses, according to Amadou Ali, 
Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Justice.  In a recent, 
wide-ranging and frank discussion with the Ambassador, Ali 
said the foundation of Cameroon's stability is the detente 
between Biya's Beti/Bulu ethnic group, which predominates in 
Cameroon's South Region, and the populations of Cameroon's 
three Northern Regions, known as the Septentrion, which are 
ethnically and culturally distinct from the rest of the 
country.  The Septentrion will support Biya for as long as he 
wants to be president, Ali predicted, but would not accept a 
successor who was either another Beti/Bulu, or a member of 
the economically powerful Bamileke ethnic group.  Ali's 
analysis and his willingness to speak so frankly about such a 
sensitive topic reinforced our conviction that Cameroon's 
political elite is increasingly focused on jockeying for the 
post-Biya era.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Ambassador, accompanied by Poloff, called on Vice 
Prime Minister and Minister for Justice Amadou Ali on 
February 27 to discuss the recently-released Human Rights 
Report (ref b).  Ali displayed his typical gregariousness, 
but was even more frank and expansive than usual as he 
discussed Cameroon's internal political struggles for more 
than one hour. 
 
Anti-Corruption: New 
Strategy, More Arrests 
---------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Ali said his campaign to pursue corrupt government 
officials continued, but that it was an increasingly low-key 
effort to pressure officials to return stolen funds.  Ali 
implied that he and Biya had decided to shift strategies in 
the anticorruption fight.  Instead of the spectacular arrests 
that characterized the initial years of the investigations 
(dubbed "Operation Epervier" or "Sparrowhawk" by the 
Cameroonian press), which Ali characterized as dangerously 
destabilizing, Ali said the focus was now on asset recovery, 
including through negotiations with corrupt officials, 
pressuring them to return funds or face public prosecution. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Ali promised more arrests in the coming days and 
said he had ordered the construction of a new wing in the 
Yaounde prison to house an influx of prominent former 
government officials.  Unlike in previous meetings, Ali did 
not complain that the U.S. and other countries were not 
helping the GRC.  Instead, Ali said that the GRC has been 
focusing on recovering assets present in Cameroon.  Ali 
welcomed the Ambassador's recommendation that the GRC seek to 
participate in the World Bank's Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) 
Initiative and admitted that the GRC's earlier efforts to 
outsource asset recovery to hired guns had proven costly in 
terms of time and money, with no results. 
 
All Politics is Regional 
------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C)  Ali held forth at length about Cameroon's political 
struggles, dismissing the formal opposition and focusing 
instead on Cameroon's ethnic and regional groupings.  Ali 
derided John Fru Ndi, the leader of the leading opposition 
party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF), saying that Fru Ndi 
was corrupt (and had pocketed hundreds of thousands of 
dollars that Cote d'Ivoire President Laurent Gbagbo had given 
the SDF) and power-hungry.  Instead, Ali argued, the real 
opposition to the GRC has always come from the 
"grasslanders," the ethnic Bamilekes in the West Region and 
the Anglophone communities in the Northwest and Southwest 
Regions.  Ali said Cameroon's other ethnic groups bore a 
pathological distrust of Bamilekes (who are sometimes 
construed as co-conspirators with Anglophones, the so-called 
Anglo-Bamis) because they were aggressive in extending their 
commercial dominance of Cameroon.  According to Ali, the 
Bamilekes had taken over Douala and were conspiring to extend 
their communities throughout Cameron, including by sending 
their women to give birth in far flung regions.  Ali argued 
it was no coincidence that the rioting in February 2008 was 
most severe in areas with large Bamileke populations. 
 
Balancing Power: 
Bamis, Betis and Northerners 
---------------------------- 
 
 
YAOUNDE 00000256  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶6.  (C)  Ali said Cameroon's three Northern regions, which 
are ethnically and culturally distinct from the rest of 
Cameroon, would continue to support Biya for as long as he 
wants to remain president, but that the next president of 
Cameroon would not come from Biya's own Beti/Bulu ethnic 
grouping, an assertion Ali said he made publicly in a 2003 
speech.  Asked what the Septentrion would do if Biya 
nominated a fellow Beti to succeed him, Ali asserted that 
Biya, knowing it would be unacceptable to the rest of 
Cameroon, would never make such a decision.  Even if Biya's 
own tribesmen sought to assert themselves, Ali said the Betis 
were too few to take on the Northerners, much less the rest 
of Cameroon.  Ali said Bamilekes had approach leading 
Northern elites to seek an alliance between their respective 
regions, but that Northerners (and other ethnic groups) were 
so suspicious of Bamileke intentions and afraid of their 
economic power, that they would never conspire to support 
Bamileke political power. 
 
Praise for the BIR, 
But Also Anxiousness 
-------------------- 
 
¶7. (C)  Ali praised the Rapid Intervention Battalions (BIR) 
that have been tasked with securing the recently-acquired 
Bakassi Peninsula and Cameroon's maritime domain, but 
expressed concern that the regular military was growing 
increasingly bitter in light of the BIR's success.  Ali was 
unsparing in his criticism of Minister of Defense Remy Ze 
Meka, saying he expected Biya to have fired him long ago, but 
certainly in the coming cabinet shuffle.  Ali said that when 
he was Minister of Defense (from 1997-2001), Avi Sivan, the 
Israeli national who oversees the BIR, reported directly to 
him.  (Note.  Colonel (Retired) Abraham ("Avi") Sivan is a 
dual citizen of Israel and Cameroon (with valid passports 
from both).  Sivan is acting in a private capacity after 
having retired as the last serving Defense Attach from 
Israel.  End note.)  When Ze Meka succeeded Ali at the head 
of Defense, Sivan obtained and provided to Biya evidence that 
Ze Meka was embezzling BIR funds, leading Biya to put the BIR 
under his direct supervision.  Ali said the generals were 
irredeemably corrupt, but doubted that Biya would take steps 
to remove them.  Nevertheless, Ali analyzed Cameroon as a 
low-risk country for a coup, saying the armed forces were 
sufficiently fractured and controlled by the Presidency (to 
the point where no troops can move without Biya's written 
assent) to render an uprising implausible. 
 
Comment: Transition: 
The Only Game in Town 
--------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  Ali's outspokenness about Cameroon's internal 
political factions reinforces our growing impression that 
Biya's succession is, at the same time, the only taboo 
subject in public discussion and the only important subject 
in private discussion.  Ali's claims that Cameroonians fear 
Bamileke political power (or Anglo-Bami power, as it is 
sometimes cast) too deeply to ever support a Bamileke should 
be taken with a grain of salt.  Although Fru Ndi is no longer 
perceived as a serious political contender (ref a), most 
observers believe Fru Ndi--an Anglophone--won the popular 
vote in 1992.  But most of Cameroon's ethnic elites likely 
view politics through the same regional/ethnic lens as Ali, 
and steadily rising socio-economic frustration among the 
general population offers a dangerous opportunity to those 
who would exploit ethnic rivalries to serve their own 
political agendas. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Ali's claim that the GRC has shifted its 
anti-corruption focus to track stolen assets within Cameroon 
jibes with what the head of Cameroon's financial intelligence 
unit told us separately (ref c).  While Ali and Biya's focus 
on asset recovery is certainly congruent with Cameroonian 
public opinion, we are concerned that Ali's willingness to 
prioritize asset recovery ahead of judicial remedies might 
lead to kleptocrats negotiating their way out of 
accountability for their crimes. 
GARVEY